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TECHNOLOGY UNBOUND: WILL FUNDED
LIBERTARIANISM DOMINATE THE

FUTURE?
Steven Goldberg*
On May 2, 2006, a liberal and a conservative on the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit joined forces and held that terminally ill
patients have a constitutional right to use certain medicines that have not
received Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval.' The panel decision
in the Abigail Alliance case may or may not survive further review, 2 but the
important point has already been established. The FDA has expressed
sympathy with the plaintiffs' desire for increased access to non-approved
drugs. 3 The increasing reduction of FDA oversight in recent decades 4 has taken
another dramatic step.
Access to pharmaceuticals does not stand alone. In vitro fertilization (IVF)
is a modem medical procedure that raises a variety of ethical and consumer
protection issues. 5 Yet in the United States, it takes place in an unregulated
environment reminiscent of the Wild West. State and federal regulators have6
almost no role, leaving the field to modest and non-binding self-regulation.
*

Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. Abigail Alliance for Better Access To Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach,
445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Judge Rogers, who wrote the opinion, is generally regarded
as liberal, while Chief Judge Ginsburg, who joined the opinion, is usually viewed as
conservative. See, e.g., Chris Mooney, Circuit Breaker, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Mar. 1,
2003, http://www.prospect.org/print/V 14/3/mooney-c.html.
2. See Christopher Bowe, Ruling on Right to Medicine Gets to the Heart of American
Culture,FIN. TIMES (USA Edition), May 17, 2006, at 4. On November 21, 2006, the panel in
Abigail Alliance denied a petition for rehearing, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to
Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 2006 U. S. App. LEXIS 28834 (D.C. Cir. Nov.
21, 2006), and the D. C. Circuit granted a petition for rehearing en banc, Abigail Alliancefor
Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 28974
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 21, 2006).
3. Bowe, supra note 2 at 4.
4. See, e.g., Marshall H. Chin, An American Dilemma: The Patient'sRole in Choice of
Medications:Direct-to-ConsumerAdvertising and PatientDecision Aids, 5 YALE J. HEALTH
POL'Y L. & ETHICS 771 (2005).
5. See, e.g., Lyria Bennett Moses, UnderstandingLegal Response to Technological
Change: The Example ofIn Vitro Fertilization,6 MINN. J. L. ScI. & TECH. 505 (2005).
6. See, e.g., Alexander N. Hecht, The Wild Wild West: Inadequate Regulation of
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Just one year before the Abigail Alliance decision, President Bush decried the
creation of "spare embryos," a central consequence of IVF,7 yet his words have
led to no restrictions on the widespread availability of this procedure.
These developments do not represent a victory for those who would let the
market decide what drugs and medical procedures should be produced and
consumed. The plaintiffs in Abigail Alliance have joined forces with groups
lobbying for increased federal spending on medical research.8 The IVF
community has a similar record of pushing for government-funded research on
enhancing fertility. 9 These groups support what might be called funded
libertarianism: the government should use taxpayers' money to support
research, but the products and procedures that result should be available on a
caveat emptor basis. The maturation of the Internet provides a rough but
helpful analogy. Developed initially with substantial government funding, the
Internet now operates in a largely unregulated fashion, despite calls for
government action against pornography and other social ills.' 0
This new pressure for unfettered access to drugs and medical procedures
turns the received wisdom about government regulation of new technology on
its head. It has long been noted that novel technologies receive far more
regulatory scrutiny than old-fashioned ones. 1' As Cass Sunstein observed in
1997, "people are especially hostile to new risks.'0 2 Coal mining may be
particularly hazardous for workers and emissions from coal plants may
substantially endanger the public, but coal mining, an old industry, will never
be subject to the level of regulatory oversight that governs the newer nuclear
power industry.' 3 Yet proponents of access to new pharmaceuticals and to IVF
actually seek less regulation than is typical for older drugs and procedures.
We will look first at the Abigail Alliance litigation and what it can tell us
about drug regulation and deregulation. We will then turn to the remarkable
status of IVF procedures, which have eluded regulation despite (or perhaps
because of) obvious links to disputes over the legal status of the embryo. We
will then look at the future of funded libertarianism. Although the matter is not
free from doubt, it seems unlikely that this approach can serve as a new
template for technological progress.
Assisted Reproductive Technology, 1 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 227 (2001).
7. William Neikirk & Mark Silva, Stem Cell Bill OKd: Measure Goes to Senate as
PresidentReaffirms Veto Promise, CHI. TRIB., May 25, 2005, at 1.
8. See infra Part I.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See, e.g., Susan P. Crawford, Shortness of Vision: Regulatory Ambition in the
DigitalAge, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 695, 704-09 (2005).
11. See Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REv. 1025
(1983).
12. Cass R. Sunstein, Which Risks First?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 101, 130 (1997).
13. See, e.g., Huber, supra note 11, at 1031.
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I. ABIGAIL ALLIANCE AND DRUG DEREGULATION

Under the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,14 a new drug cannot be
marketed until the FDA determines it is safe and effective. The FDA makes
this determination by subjecting investigational new drugs (INDs) to three
phases of testing.' 5 In order to understand the holding of the Abigail Alliance
court, it is necessary to describe these phases.
Phase I testing, which takes about one year, involves administering the
6
drug to a small number of human subjects to determine if it is dangerous.1 The
subjects are often healthy, although Phase I can also involve ill patients.
According to the FDA, drugs that make it through Phase I are "sufficiently safe
for substantial human testing," but they have not yet been shown to be safe and
17
effective enough to be commercially sold.
If an IND survives Phase I, it moves to Phase II, where it is subjected to a
large controlled clinical study involving hundreds of human subjects who have
the disease for which the drug is designed. The participants are randomly
divided into two groups, one receiving the drug and the other a placebo.
Neither the subjects nor those administering the drugs know which group a
patient is in. Phase II provides evidence on the effectiveness of the IND as well
as additional evidence on its safety. If a drug makes it through Phase II, it
moves on to Phase III, which is an expanded controlled study that might
involve thousands of human subjects. Those INDs that successfully complete,
Phase III are eligible to be marketed commercially.
This FDA process can take years. An individual who might benefit from a
drug under study might not be chosen for the clinical trials and, in any event,
might receive a placebo in those trials. The FDA has the authority to grant
"compassionate use" exemptions for patients who are not receiving a drug
under study, but it typically does so only when a drug has at least entered Phase
II and there is some evidence of the drug's effectiveness.
The Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs (Abigail
Alliance) is a lobbying group that was founded by Frank Burroughs after his
18
twenty-one-year-old daughter Abigail died in 2001 of cancer. Abigail was
that were working their way through the FDA
unable to obtain promising drugs
19
process while she was dying.
14. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1997).
15. AbigailAlliance, 445 F.3d 470, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

16. The description of FDA procedures in the following three paragraphs is drawn
from Abigail Alliance, 445 F. 3d at 473-74, and from Gail H. Javitt, Drugs and Vaccines for
the Common Defense: Refining FDA Regulation to Promote the Availability of Products to
Counter BiologicalAttack, 19 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 37, 52-59, 97-107 (2002).
17. AbigailAlliance, 445 F.3d at 473.
2005,
13,
Nov.
NEWS,
CBS
Miracle,
a
18. Fighting for
4
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/11/13/sunday/main10 1404.shtml.
19. Id.

STANFORD LA WAND POLICY REVIEW

[Vol. 18:21

On June 11, 2003, the Abigail Alliance and the Washington Legal
Foundation petitioned the FDA to allow terminally ill patients to have access to
drugs that had made it through Phase I of the FDA process. 2 After the petition
was denied, they brought suit.21 The District Court dismissed their case, but the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed.22
Written by Judge Judith Rogers, a Clinton appointee associated with the
court's liberal wing, and joined by Chief Judge Douglas Ginsburg, a
conservative Reagan appointee, Abigail Alliance found that terminally ill
patients have a substantive due process right to use "potentially life-saving new
drugs that the FDA has yet to approve for commercial marketing but that the
FDA has determined, after Phase I clinical human trials, are safe enough for
further testing on a substantial number of human beings." 23 By carefully
defining their claim in this fashion, the plaintiffs persuaded the court that they
had satisfied the Supreme Court's requirement that the Due24 Process Clause not
be used to "multiply rights without principled boundaries.,
Moreover, by limiting their claim to drugs that have made it through Phase
I, the plaintiffs avoided the question of whether individuals have a right to
unsafe medications, and thus avoided a precedent from 1980 upholding the
FDA's refusal to approve the use of Laetrile for cancer.2 5 As Judge Rogers
said, Laetrile might have been "a poison," while Phase I approval assures that
drugs have passed somewhat of a threshold.26
The panel's substantive due process analysis found that terminally ill
patients had a fundamental right to use potentially life-saving drugs by
applying the Supreme Court's Glucksberg2 7 approach.28 Under this test, the
court asks whether the asserted fundamental right is "objectively, 'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' and whether it is "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if
29
[it] were sacrificed.,
On the historical point, the court, citing cases beginning in 1609, argued
that control over one's body has been traditionally protected at common law for
centuries. 30 Government regulation, on the other hand, began in 1906, and only

20. AbigailAlliance,445 F.3d at 473.

21. Id.at473-74.
22. Id.at 474, 486.
23. Id.at 477.

24. Id.
25. Id.at 485-86.
26. Id. at 486.

27. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
28. AbigailAlliance, 445 F.3d at 475-77.

29. Id. at 476-77 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721).
30. Id.at 480-83.
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in 1962 did Congress require that drugs be effective as well as safe.31
This approach, of course, turns entirely on the level of generality employed
on judicial review. It was in the twentieth century that the public became aware
of the dangers of modem pharmaceuticals, 32 and so it is not surprising that
regulation began then.
Under the court's approach, it will be difficult to find a tradition of
government regulation for any new technology. In this sense, the court was
echoing the approach used by the Supreme Court when it struck down the
Communications Decency Act (CDA) 33 which was designed to regulate
offensive communications on the Internet: "Neither before nor after the
enactment of the CDA have the vast democratic fora of the Internet been
subject to the type of government supervision and regulation that has attended
the broadcast industry." 34 Given the newness of the "vast democratic fora of
the Internet" when Congress passed the CDA in 1996,35 the lack of previous
regulation is hardly surprising.
Turning to whether the liberty interest in taking a life saving drug is
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," the court relied on the Supreme
Court's Cruzan36 decision, which found a substantive due process right to
refuse treatment. 37 "The logical corollary" of Cruzan, the court reasoned, "is
that an individual must also be free to decide for herself whether to assume any
known or unknown risks of taking a medication that might prolong her life."38
Having found a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause, the
court remanded the case to the district court to give the government an
opportunity to argue that its regulatory regime is "narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest." 39 This is always a difficult burden for the
government to meet.40 One possible approach would be to argue that making
drugs available after Phase I would make it impossible to recruit patients for
the controlled studies that take place under Phases II and III. Who would want
to run the risk of being given a placebo when they can obtain the experimental

31. ld at 481-83.
32. Id. at 482.
33. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1996),portions invalidatedby Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844
(1997).
34. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997).
35. Id.at 844, 849, 868-69.
36. Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
37. AbigailAlliance, 445 F.3d at 484.
38. Id. For a related argument that the government cannot refuse access to safe and
effective medicines derived from therapeutic cloning, see Steven Goldberg, Cloning
Matters: How Lawrence v. Texas Protects TherapeuticResearch, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y
L. & ETHIcs 305 (2004).
39. AbigailAlliance,445 F.3d at 486.
40. On the difficulty of meeting it here, see id. at 499-500 (Griffith, J., dissenting).
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drug in question on their own? 41 Without the later phases, the government
would lack the evidence on efficacy and the additional information on safety
that the current approach provides. But the Abigail Alliance court might well
conclude that this desire for further information does not overcome a terminally
ill patient's right to potentially life saving treatment.
The substantive due process right found in Abigail Alliance may not
survive. As the dissent points out, the Supreme Court may well believe that the
legislature, rather than the courts, is the appropriate place to balance the
conflicting values involved in drug regulation.42 Reversal of Abigail Alliance
by the en banc District of Columbia Circuit or by the Supreme Court is quite
possible.
But the broader point-the remarkable attractiveness of reduced regulation
of powerful pharmaceuticals-will remain, regardless of further litigation. The
seemingly odd coalition of Judge Rogers and Chief Judge Ginsburg is part of a
bigger picture. Spurred in part by the AIDS epidemic, faster access to new
drugs has been an increasingly popular position for decades.4 3 The FDA's
"compassionate use" policy was codified by Congress in 1997, 44 and there have
been continuing calls on Capitol Hill for further deregulation.45 The classic
scientific value of the double-blind studies in Phases II and III is46increasingly
seen as an inadequate basis for refusing consumer access to drugs.
But this is not a libertarian movement. Despite the considerable private
expenditures on research and development by drug companies, there is strong
support by those who would loosen FDA requirements for using taxpayers'
money for government-supported basic research in this area. The Abigail
Alliance does not believe in leaving the emergence of pharmaceuticals to the
private market. It has joined forces with the Sarcoma Foundation of America,
which advocates "increased government funding" of cancer research, and with
Research America, which calls for "strong, increased investment" by agencies
such as the National Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation.47
41. In the past, patients have enrolled in multiple studies to reduce the odds they are
receiving placebos. Lois K. Perrin, Note, The Catch-22for Persons With AIDS: To Have or
Not to Have Easy Access to Experimental Therapies and Early Approval for New Drugs, 69
S. CAL. L. REv. 105, 126 (1995).
42. AbigailAlliance, 445 F.3d at 491-99 (Griffith, J., dissenting).
43. See Chin, supra note 4; Javitt, supra note 16.
44. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb (2006), amended by National Institutes Health Reform Act of
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-482, 120 Stat. 3675 (2007).
45. See, e.g., Steven R. Salbu, Regulation of Drug Treatments for HIV and AIDS: A
ContractarianModel ofAccess, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 401, 418 (1994).
46. Id. passim.
47. The Abigail Alliance says on their web page that they are "working together" with
the Sarcoma Foundation and that they "join forces" with Research America. Abigail
Alliance Homepage, http://abigail-alliance.org/ (last visited June 19, 2006). The Abigail
Alliance page provides links to the web pages of these organizations from which the quotes
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This is what might be called funded libertarianism. And, as the case of IVF
shows, it does not stand alone.
II.

ASSISTED REPRODUCTION AND PRIVATE CHOICES

Assisted reproductive technologies have revolutionized procreation in
is in vitro fertilization, which
recent decades. The most widely used technology
48
infertility.
of
types
several
overcome
is used to
In its most common form, IVF involves removing eggs from a woman's
ovaries, fertilizing them with sperm, and then transferring one or more of the
49
fertilized eggs into the woman's uterus in the hope of starting a pregnancy.
The procedure is quite modem. The first "test-tube baby," Louise Brown, was
bom in the United Kingdom in 1978, while the first such birth in the United
To date, well over 200,000 IVF babies have been
States took place in 1981.50
51
bom in the United States.
There has been sharp controversy about IVF from the beginning. 52 Much
of it stems from the fact that multiple eggs are fertilized in the laboratory. It is
then common to insert several fertilized eggs into the uterus to raise the odds of
a successful pregnancy.5 3 As a result, the instance of twins, triplets, and other
may be health hazards as a result
multiple births increases with IVF and there
54
to the babies, as well as to their mothers.
But the largest controversies come because more eggs are typically
fertilized than are introduced into the uterus. These "spare embryos" are often
frozen, and after a period of time they are sometimes discarded by the
laboratories with the consent of the egg and sperm donors. 55 To many
Americans, a "spare embryo" is a human life.56 As a result, discarding an

in the text are taken. See Sarcoma Foundation of America Homepage,
http://www.curesarcoma.org/ (last visited June 19, 2006); Research!America Homepage,
http://www.researchamerica.org/about/ (last visited June 19, 2006).

48. Note, Assessing the Viability of a Substantive Due Process Right to In Vitro
Fertilization,118 HARv. L. REv. 2792, 2793 (2005).
49. Mary Ann Davis Moriarty, Note and Comment, Addressing In Vitro Fertilization
and the Problem of Multiple Gestations, 18 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 503, 504-05 (1999).
50. Id at 505.
51. Joshua Kleinfeld, Tort Law and In Vitro Fertilization: The Need for Legal
Recognition of "ProcreativeInjury," 115 YALE L.J. 237, 238 n. 1 (2005).
52. See, e.g., Stephen Smith, Twenty Years of Test-tube Babies: A Revolutionary Birth

1998), available at
Public Radio Broadcast Apr. July 23,
(Minnesota
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/I 99711/20_smiths fertility/part7/section 1.sht
ml.
53. Moriarty, supranote 49, at 507.
54. Id.
55. MICHAEL H. SHAPIRO & RoY G. SPECE, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON
BIOETHICS AND LAW 625-41 (2d ed. 2003).

56. Barbara Gregoratos, Note, Tempest in the Laboratory:Medical Research on Spare
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embryo is utterly unacceptable. If you doubt that this point of view is
important, consider the titanic controversy over stem cell research. Whether the
government should fund or even allow such research on "spare embryos" has
divided legislatures and the public for years. 5 7 It was a proposal for federal
support of stem cell research that lead to President Bush's May 2005 statement
that there should be no "spare embryos" and that excess embryos resulting
from IVF should be adopted. 58 His proposal has had no impact on the
availability of IVF.
One would think that since many Americans want to forbid stem cell
research on embryos, there would be enormous state and federal restrictions on
simply discarding the very same embryos. But that would be wrong. The
hundreds of medical centers offering IVF across the United States operate in
what many commentators have called a "Wild West" environment of nonregulation. 59 While a federal statute requires that such centers disclose certain
information about the success rate of their procedures in bringing about
pregnancies, 60 there is virtually no government regulation at any level relating
to the risks associated with multiple births or to the disposition of spare
self-regulation, but many centers
embryos. 6 1 Industry groups provide limited
62
are not even members of such groups.
To some extent, IVF benefits from the all-or-nothing approach many
people take to the question of embryonic life. Many opponents of IVF would
entirely forbid the procedure,63 and they do not have the political power to
bring about that result. Yet there is nothing about IVF that makes regulation
Kingdom, for example, IVF is a
short of prohibition impossible. In the United
64
lawful, but closely regulated, procedure.
The key to the American situation is that IVF proponents want to make
their own decisions about reproduction free from government interference.
They want to weigh the risks and benefits of multiple pregnancies and they
Embryosfrom In Vitro Fertilization,37 HASTINGS L.J. 977, 983-84 (1986).
57. See, e.g., LOPR B. ANDREWS ET AL., GENETICS: ETHICS, LAW AND

POLICY 165-82

(2d ed. 2006).
58. Neikirk & Silva, supra note 7.
59. See Hecht, supra note 6; Michael J. Malinowski, Choosing the Genetic Makeup of
Children: Our Eugenics Past-Present, and Future?, 36 CONN. L. REv. 125, 179 (2003)
(quoting Making Babies (PBS television broadcast June 1, 1999)).
60. Congress has enacted the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of
1992. 42 U.S.C. § 263a-1 (1992). See Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and
the Pitfalls of UnregulatedBiomedicalInnovation, 55 FLA. L. REv. 603, 614-15 (2003).
61. See Hecht, supra note 6.
62. See Noah, supra note 60, at 606 n.9.
63. See, e.g., John B. Shea, The Moral Status of In Vitro Fertilization(IVF), CATHOLIC
2003,
available
at
INSIGHT,
Jan.-Feb.,
http://catholicinsight.com/online/church/vatican/article_475.shtml.
64. Moses, supra note 5, at 545-49.
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want to determine the fate of the embryos they create without state regulation.
This is obviously tied to the pro-choice position on abortion. But not
everyone who utilizes IVF supports Roe v. Wade.65 People seeking to have a
baby may be pro-life in more ways than one. 66 Our understanding of the
unregulated state of the American IVF industry is enhanced by looking at the
effort in recent decades to reduce FDA regulation of life-saving drugs. In both
cases we see a desire for unmediated access to new technology or, in other
words, for a kind of libertarian approach to the fruits of modem science.
And in both cases it is funded libertarianism that is desired. The infertility
lobby, which strongly supports IVF, does not want to leave to the marketplace
the production of new techniques to enhance reproduction any more than the
Abigail Alliance wants to keep the government out of drug research.
Consider RESOLVE, The National Infertility Association (RESOLVE), a
major lobbying group founded in 1974. RESOLVE "supports the rights of
individuals experiencing infertility ...to elect their family building method(s)"
and "to be free from interference in making the very personal decision about
the uses of their own body tissues, including reproductive tissues and fertilized
reproductive tissues." 67 Indeed, RESOLVE believes "the current regulatory
environment for assisted reproduction ...works phenomenally well. 6 s On the
other hand, RESOLVE supports increased funding for infertility research by
the National Institutes of Health, the National Institute of Child Health and
Human Development, and the Centers for Disease Control.69
Because there is no meaningful regulation of IVF, there is no case like
Abigail Alliance challenging such regulation. But if the government were ever
to sharply restrict access to IVF, it is easy to imagine the contours of a
challenge that might be brought.
First, just as the court in Abigail Alliance was able to describe drug
regulation as relatively new, opponents of restrictions on IVF would be free to
argue that those restrictions are novel. These opponents would note that for
decades after the 1978 birth of Louise Brown the government left IVF alone.
Of course this argument depends arbitrarily on the frame of reference, but in a
legal culture that views the Internet as historically unregulated, those opposing
IVF restrictions would have a plausible argument.
As for showing that they are defending an interest "implicit in the concept
65. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
66. Janet L. Dolgin, Surrounding Embryos: Biology, Ideology, and Politics, 16
HEALTH MATRIX 27, 36-38 (2006).
67. Letter from Bonnie Gilbert, Acting Executive Dir., RESOLVE to 0. Carter Snead,
General Counsel, The President's Council on Bioethics (on file with author), available at

http ://www.resolve.org/site/PageServer?pagename-ta_papregart.
68. Id.
Lobby,
Infertility
The
Profile:
69. Player
http://www.stanford.edu/class/siwl 98q/websites/reprotech/New%2OWays%20of /o20Makin
g%20Babies/resolve.htm (last visited June 2, 2006).
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of ordered liberty," IVF supporters would cite the line of cases from Skinner v.
Oklahoma70 to Griswold7 1 and Roe72 , which establish a right to make personal
decisions about reproduction free from govemment control. Here again, while
it is far from clear that the courts would extend this controversial line of cases
in a new direction, the argument, which draws on support for bringing about
new life and which has been endorsed by several commentators, is far from
on IVF
frivolous. 73 It is plausible that any material government restriction
74
would have to meet the demanding "compelling state interest" test.
As with drug regulation, the important point about IVF is not how
restrictions would fare in court, but how our broader social attitudes find
expression. Couples want the freedom to make their own decisions, combined
with substantial government funding for research, to enhance the choices
available to them.
III. THE FUTURE OF FUNDED LIBERTARIANISM
Are the movements to secure access to drugs that have only been through
Phase I testing and to utilize IVF free of regulation harbingers of things to
come? At a minimum, they do not stand alone. After decades of strict FDA
regulation and physician oversight, patients are pushing for an increased role in
deciding what new pharmaceuticals to take, as the growth of direct-toconsumer advertising for prescription drugs makes clear.75 And after decades in
which the law was deeply suspicious of new methods of reproduction, a lack of
regulation is becoming the norm for a variety of assisted reproductive
technologies. It is hard to believe that not long ago courts found that sperm
donation constituted adultery, 76 while today surrogacy, pre-implantation
and a host of other developments have reshaped human
genetic diagnosis,
77
reproduction.
These developments are particularly striking because they involve reduced
regulation for new risks. In 1983, Peter Huber began his influential article The
Old-New Division in Risk Regulation: "Federal systems of risk regulation
70. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("The right to
procreate is a basic right of man, so fundamental to the existence of the human race that the

government should not interfere.").
71. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
72. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

73. John A. Robertson,

Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 AM. J.L. &
MED. 439, 453 (2003); Note, supra note 48, at 2813.
74. Moriarty, supra note 49, at 516.
75. See Chin, supra note 4.
76. Note, Human Cloning and Substantive Due Process, 111 HARV. L. REv. 2348,

2360 (1998).
77. SHAPIRO & SPECE, supra note 55, at 621-631.
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subtly but systematically distinguish the devils we know from the ominous
unknown." 78 Surveying a host of regulatory environments, he found that new
products and technologies were subjected to more regulation than those that
had been around for a long time: "Old risks are those to which society has been
widely exposed before Congress or an agency finds federal regulation
necessary .... New risks loom on79 the horizon, threatening to undermine the
perceived safety of the status quo."
Cass Sunstein's impressive 1997 analysis of risk regulation supported
Huber's insight, noting that "people are especially hostile to new risks. Old
"status quo
risks tend to be taken for granted." 80 Sunstein identified a general
8
'
bias" under which we "impose special barriers to new risks."
This tendency to regulate the new more stringently than the old has been a
particular feature of food and drug regulation, making the Abigail Alliance
movement particularly remarkable. Huber's article described at length how the
FDA failed in its efforts to regulate saccharin, a well-established sugar
substitute which posed a cancer risk, while it successfully restricted access to
newer products that were no more dangerous. 82 In a detailed discussion of FDA
regulation of additives that might cause cancer, Richard Merrill found that
government policies "favor old additives and disfavor new ones."8 3 The
argument that consumer choices, old 84and new, are "voluntary" and should be
unregulated has never carried the day.
Under the circumstances, it is appropriate to ask whether the new push for
funded libertarianism represents the beginning of a trend. We can dispose of
one part of this question quite easily. The "funded" part of funded
libertarianism represents an extension of established policy and is certain to
endure. In supporting federally funded research on drugs and fertility, the
groups we are discussing are safely in the mainstream.
In theory, government funding of basic research does not fit easily with
unfettered consumer choice. Funded libertarianism is a paradoxical concept,
since for libertarians, mandatory taxation for science is deeply problematic. In
End Government Science Funding, a paper published by the Cato Institute,
Terence Kealey argues that "companies fund pure science very generously,"
while government funding of science "is largely unproductive," and he
concludes that "[s]cientists may love government money, and politicians may
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love the power its expenditure
confers upon them, but society is impoverished
85
by the transaction.
That may be the theory, but the reality is that the federal government has
long funded basic research, such funding enjoys broad bipartisan support, and
it is not going to end any time soon.86 Either because of weaknesses in his
theoretical argument,8 7 or because of political realities, Kealey's point of view
is not about to prevail.
The real question is whether relatively unregulated access to new products
and procedures is going to gradually replace large areas of current government
control. Only time will tell whether we are seeing the beginning of a new era in
which consumers increasingly make their own risk calculations. But I must
confess that I am doubtful. Indeed, I believe the Abigail Alliance and IVF
movements will not lead to a lasting reduction of regulation, even in their own
fields.
There are inevitably bad outcomes with any technology, and when those
problems arise in a dramatic setting, media attention and public concern will
follow. A risky pharmaceutical that was not fully tested could kill the child of a
celebrity. A prominent woman who was carrying multiple embryos could die
during childbirth. Of course, there are risks in all human endeavors. But the
strength of Huber's and Sunstein's analyses of old versus new risks stems in
part from the fact that with old risks we have a frame of reference spanning
generations. Coal miners have died before, while nuclear accidents remain
relatively novel.
The avenues for prompt government regulation of new technologies are
wide and well-known. Most prominently, the government has broad
constitutional power to attach strings to the funding it provides. 8 Science
spending is not exempt. The requirement of Institutional Review Boards for
research funded by the government came about because of abuses relating to
research involving human subjects.8 9 So even in the absence of direct
regulation, new pharmaceuticals and IVF face the reality of government
regulation precisely because they are often government-funded.
The imposition of federal regulation tied to federal money is not the only
threat facing unregulated new technologies. High-profile problems will also
bring forth a rash of tort suits, where the absence of generations of experience
will present plaintiffs with the possibility of high payoffs.
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If a new drug that has only gone through Phase I testing turns out to be
costly, ineffective, and more deadly than Phase I indicated, consumers are not
going to sit back and accept the risks they originally embraced. They are going
to sue. And if the availability of Phase I drugs makes it impossible to run
clinical trials, there are going to be more costly, ineffective, and deadly drugs
on the market. The Abigail Alliance lawsuit would appear to open up new
markets for the pharmaceutical industry, but drug companies have opposed the
result in Abigail Alliance.90 They may well believe that the prospect of tort
liability outweighs immediate sales.
Similarly, the IVF industry is kidding itself if it believes that it cannot be
hurt if public attention is drawn to bad outcomes, whether they concern the
91
implantation of an embryo that might have been exposed to mad cow disease
or the more general problems arising from the lack of any limit on the number
of embryos that are implanted in the uterus. 92 There are already calls for
increased tort liability for the IVF industry, 93 and that kind of liability can be
the precursor of administrative regulation.
I continue to believe that prudent regulation of technology is not an antiprogress strategy, but just the opposite. If new developments do not meet
societal expectations for safety, they will, in the long run, be weakened. 94 The
desire for new drugs and fertility treatments will not change that reality.
Funded libertarianism is unlikely to carry the day.
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